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Abstract. The symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to
admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is nite
and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a
lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the
undissipated rent.
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1. Introduction
Mixed equilibria in contests of the generalized Tullock form, for which win-
ning probabilities depend on the ratio of resources expended, have recently
received much attention from theorists (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm,
2010; Ewerhart, 2015, 2017a, 2017b; Feng and Lu, 2017). There is another
appealing class of contests, however, where the winning probabilities depend
instead on the di¤erence of resources expended (Hirshleifer, 1989; Skaper-
das, 1996; Baik, 1998; Che and Gale, 2000). In particular, Hirshleifers
framework has its merits for the analysis of military combat (Dupuy, 1987;
Hirshleifer, 2000). Notwithstanding, the nature of mixed equilibria in that
model has remained poorly understood.
In this paper, we prove uniqueness of the equilibrium in the symmetric
two-player Hirshleifer contest, and o¤er a characterization of the mixed equi-
librium. It is shown that the support of the symmetric equilibrium strategy
is nite and includes the origin. Moreover, the cardinality of the support
grows over any nite bound as the decisiveness parameter goes to innity.
Further, we show that the undissipated rent converges to zero as the de-
cisiveness parameter goes to innity, and that ex-post overdissipation may
occur. We conclude by extending the uniqueness result to a larger class of
contests.
The uniqueness result is stated in Section 2, and proven in Section 3.
Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium. Rent dissipation is dealt with in
Section 5. Section 6 discusses ex-post overdissipation. Alternative contest
technologies are considered in Section 7.
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2. Statement of the uniqueness result
The Hirshleifer contest is specied as follows. Each of two players i 2 f1; 2g
expends resources xi  0 in an attempt to win a prize of normalized value
one. Player is payo¤ is given as
i(xi; xj) =
exp(xi)
exp(xi) + exp(xj)
  xi (1)
=
1
1 + exp((xj   xi))   xi, (2)
where j 2 f1; 2g with j 6= i, and  > 0 measures the decisiveness of the
di¤erence-form contest. In particular, for  ! 1, payo¤s converge against
those of the all-pay auction.
Any bid exceeding one is strictly dominated. We therefore dene a mixed
strategy for player i as a probability measure i on the Borel subsets of [0; 1].
The set of mixed strategies for player i will be denoted by M , where pure
strategies xi 2 [0; 1] are interpreted as Dirac measures, as usual. Each player
is expected payo¤ is well-dened for any (i; j) 2M M , and will, with
some abuse of notation, be denoted by i(i; j). An equilibrium is a pair
 = (1; 2) 2MM such that i(i ; j )  i(i; j ) for any i; j 2 f1; 2g
with j 6= i, and for any i 2M .
Proposition 1. For any  > 0, the Hirshleifer contest with parameter 
has a unique equilibrium.
3. Proof of Proposition 1
Equilibrium existence is known (cf. Hirshleifer, 1989, fn. 12). The proof of
uniqueness starts from the following observation.
Lemma 1. Let  = (1; 2) 2 M M . Then, for any i; j 2 f1; 2g with
j 6= i, the set of maximizers Xi() = arg maxexi2[0;1] i(exi; j) is nite.
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Proof. The proof is a straightforward adaption of Ewerhart (2015, Th.
3.2), and therefore omitted.1 
Next, we show the following.
Lemma 2. The set X =
\
 equilibrium
X1(
) is nonempty, and contains
the support of any equilibrium strategy (for both players).
Proof. Take an equilibrium  = (1; 2). Clearly, the support of 1
is a subset of X1(). Let  = (1 ; 2 ) be an arbitrary equilibrium.
Then, since equilibria in two-player contests are interchangeable (Ewerhart,
2017b, Appendix), (1; 2 ) is an equilibrium. Therefore, the support of 1
is a subset of X1(1; 2 ). But X1(1; 2 ) = X1(). Hence, the support
of 1 is contained inX1() for any equilibrium . In particular, X 6= ?.
The second claim follows by symmetry. 
Denote byK = jXj the number of elements ofX. Thus,X = fz1; :::; zKg,
where z1 > z2 > ::: > zK . Suppose rst that K = 1. Then, the equilib-
rium is obviously unique. Suppose next that K  2. Fix some equilibrium
 = (1; 2), and let pmj = 

i (fzmg)  0 denote the weight assigned by j
to zm, for j 2 f1; 2g and m 2 f1; :::;Kg. We know that z1; :::; zK all deliver
the equilibrium payo¤ i against 

j , i.e.,
i =
 
KX
m=1
pmj
exp(zk)
exp(zk) + exp(zm)
!
  zk (k = 1; :::;K; j 6= i). (3)
Thus, there are K equations to identify (K + 1) unknowns p1j ; :::; p
K
j and
i . Notably, adding the relationship
PK
m=1 p
m
j = 1 does not help in general.
Instead, we focus on the largest element of the support of player is equi-
librium strategy.2 Since K  2, we know that z1 is an interior maximum.
1 If attention is restricted to strategies that are absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure, the use of complex-analytic methods may be circumvented (Sun,
2017).
2The rst-named author would like to thank Larry Samuelson for this suggestion.
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Hence, the rst-order condition implies
KX
m=1
pmj
 exp(z1) exp(zm)
(exp(z1) + exp(zm))2
= 1. (4)
Combining these (K + 1) equations yields0BBBBB@
exp(z1)
exp(z1)+exp(z1)
   exp(z1)exp(z1)+exp(zK) 1
...
. . .
...
...
exp(zK)
exp(zK)+exp(z1)
   exp(zK)exp(zK)+exp(zK) 1
 exp(z1) exp(z1)
(exp(z1)+exp(z1))2
    exp(z1) exp(zK)
(exp(z1)+exp(zK))2
0
1CCCCCA
0BBB@
p1j
...
pKj
 i
1CCCA =
0BBB@
z1
...
zK
1
1CCCA .
(5)
It turns out that (5) has at most one solution.
Lemma 3. The square matrix on the left-hand side of (5) is invertible.
Proof. Let ek = exp(zk) for k = 1; :::;K, and
A1 =
0BBBBBB@
e1
e1+e1
   e1e1+eK 1
e2
e2+e1
   e2e2+eK 1
...
. . .
...
...
eK
eK+e1
   eKeK+eK 1
e1e1
(e1+e1)2
   e1eK
(e1+eK)2
0
1CCCCCCA . (6)
Subtracting row k = 1 from row k, for k = 2; :::;K, yields detA1 = detA2,
where
A2 =
0BBBBBBB@
e1
e1+e1
   e1e1+eK 1
(e2 e1)e1
(e2+e1)(e1+e1)
   (e2 e1)eK(e2+eK)(e1+eK) 0
...
. . .
...
...
(eK e1)e1
(eK+e1)(e1+e1)
   (eK e1)eK(eK+eK)(e1+eK) 0
e1e1
(e1+e1)2
   e1eK
(e1+eK)2
0
1CCCCCCCA
. (7)
Next, we extract the factor em=(e1 + em) > 0 from column m, for m =
1; :::;K, and the factor (ek   e1) > 0 from row k, for k = 2; :::;K. Further,
we extract the factor e1 > 0 from the last row. This yields
detA2 =
0@ Y
1mK
em
e1 + em
1A 
0@ Y
2kK
(ek   e1)
1A  e1  detA3, (8)
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where
A3 =
0BBBBBB@
e1
e1
e1
e2
   e1eK 1
1
e2+e1
1
e2+e2
   1e2+eK 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
1
eK+e1
1
eK+e2
   1eK+eK 0
1
e1+e1
1
e1+e2
   1e1+eK 0
1CCCCCCA . (9)
Finally, we exchange row 1 and row K + 1. Therefore, detA3 =  detA4,
where A4 = f 1ek+em gk=1;:::;K;m=1;:::;K is a Cauchy matrix (e.g., Kratten-
thaler, 2001) with
detA4 =
Y
1k<mK(ek   em)
2Y
1kK;1mK(ek + em)
6= 0. (10)
This proves the lemma. 
Recall that the support of any equilibrium is contained in X = fz1; :::; zKg.
Hence, with probabilities p1j ; :::; p
K
j being unique, there can indeed be at most
one equilibrium.
4. Characterization3
Since the Hirshleifer contest with parameter  > 0 admits only one equilib-
rium, the two players necessarily use the same equilibrium strategy  2M .
The following result characterizes .
Proposition 2. Let  > 0. Then, the following properties hold:
(i)  has nite support fy1; :::; yLg, where y1 > ::: > yL, with L  4 .
(ii)  has a mass point at the zero bid, i.e., yL = 0.
(iii) there is two-sided peace (i.e., L = 1) if and only if   4.
Proof. (i) By Lemma 1, the support of  is nite. Denote by qm =
(fymg) > 0 the probability assigned to ym, for m 2 f1; :::; Lg. From the
3This section and the next supersede the corresponding parts of earlier work by the
authors (Ewerhart, 2014; Sun, 2017).
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KKT conditions,
ql
4
+
LX
m=1
m6=l
qm exp(ym) exp(yl)
(exp(yl) + exp(ym))2
 1

(l = 1; :::; L), (11)
with equality for l = 1; :::; L 1, so that ql  4 for any l = 1; :::; L. Therefore,
L  4 . (ii) For L = 1, the claim is due to Hirshleifer (1989). Suppose next
that L  2. Then, player is expected payo¤ against  at the smallest mass
point yL satises
@2i(yL; )
@x2i
=
L 1X
m=1
qm
2(exp(ym)  exp(yL)) exp(yL) exp(ym)
(exp(yL) + exp(ym))3
(12)
> 0, (13)
which shows that yL cannot be an interior maximum. Hence, yL = 0.
(iii) Hirshleifer (1989) has shown that two-sided peace is an equilibrium for
  4. For  > 4, however, part (i) implies L  2. 
Example (L = 2). Consider an equilibrium strategy  that places prob-
ability q1 > 0 on y1 > 0, and probability 1  q1 > 0 on y2 = 0. Then,
y1 =
1
2
  1
1 + exp(y1)
, (14)
q1 = 1    4
4y21
. (15)
This equilibrium exists numerically for  2 (4; 6:79).4
4The implicit value for y1 may be characterized alternatively in terms of the r-Lambert
function (Mesö and Baricz, 2017).
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5. Rent dissipation
Rent dissipation is always incomplete in the Hirshleifer contest.5 For  !
1, however, the equilibrium payo¤  goes to zero, as the following result
shows.
Proposition 3.   2 .
Proof.
 = i(0; ) (16)
=
LX
l=1
ql
1 + exp(yl)
(17)
 2
LX
l=1
ql
1 + exp(yl)
 exp(yl)
1 + exp(yl)
(18)
=
2


@i(0; )
@xi
+ 1

. (19)
Since @i(0; )=@xi  0, the claim follows. 
Figure 1 outlines the equilibrium payo¤ and its upper bound as a function
of . Note that , contrary to intuition, is not globally declining. For
example, if  = 6:1 (< 6:6), the equilibrium is given by y1 = 0:4337 (0:4517),
q1 = 0:5425 (0:5173), and  = 0:2646 (< 0:2662). Thus, the increase in y1
is more than compensated by a decline in q1.
5This fact contrasts, of course, with the complete rent dissipation pervasive in su¢ -
ciently decisive contests of the ratio form (Baye et al., 1994; Alcade and Dahm, 2010;
Ewerhart, 2015, 2017a).
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Figure 1. Undissipated rent as a function of .
6. Ex-post overdissipation
Although rent dissipation is less severe than in the Tullock case, the Hirsh-
leifer contest may nevertheless feature ex-post overdissipation, i.e., the sum
of realized bids may exceed the value of the prize with positive probability
(cf. Baye et al., 1999).
Proposition 4. y1  34   103 :
Proof. Recall that y1 > ::: > yL. Let L be the largest l 2 f1; :::; Lg such
that
exp(y1)
exp(y1) + exp(yl)
<
3
4
, (20)
and let
Q =
LX
l=1
ql. (21)
Then, by Proposition 3,
2

   3
4
(1 Q) + 1
2
Q  y1. (22)
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Therefore,
Q  3  4y1   8

. (23)
But, from the rst-order condition at y1,
1  
LX
l=1
ql
exp(y1) exp(yl)
(exp(y1) + exp(yl))
2   Q 
3
4
 1
4
. (24)
Using (23) in (24) yields the claim. 
Proposition 4 implies that ex-post overdissipation occurs for any su¢ ciently
large . Using numerical analysis, we veried that y1 > 0:5 holds for  > 7:2.
7. Alternative contest technologies
Consider a contest technology of the form
hi (xi; xj) =
h(xi)
h(xi) + h(xj)
  xi, (25)
where h > 0 is a positive impact function (as in Neary, 1997). Provided
that h admits, in addition, a real-analytic extension to ( ";1), for some
" > 0, the uniqueness argument goes through. In that case, however, the
equilibrium need no longer possess a mass point at the origin.6
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